Epistemologists, among others, often fall into the trap or expecting dispositions to have uniform exercises. For instance, when they recognise that the verbs ‘know’ and ‘believe’ are ordinarily used dispositionally, they assume that there must therefore exist one-pattern intellectual processes in which these cognitive disposi- tions are actualised. Flouting the testimony of experience, they postulate that, for example, a man who believes that^the earth is round must from time to time be going through some unique proceeding of cognising, judging’, or internally re-asserting, with a feeling ofconfidence, ‘The earth is round’. In fact, ofcourse, people do not harp on statements in this way, and even if they did do so and even if we knew that they did, we still should not be satisfied that they believed that the earth was round, unless we also found them inferring, imagining, saying and dbing a great number of other things as well. If we found them inferring, imagining, saying and doing these other tilings, we should be satisfied that they believed the earth to be round, even if we had the best reasons for thinking that they never internally harped on the original statement at all. However often and stoutly a skater avers to us or to himself, that the ice will bear, he shows that he has his qualms, if he keeps to the edge of the pond, calls his children away from the middle, keeps his eye on the life-belts or continually speculates what would happen, if the ice broke.